Page 10 - CMA Journal (Sep-Oct 2026)
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E x c lus iv e I nt er v iew
Only 43% of surveyed jurisdictions have developed provide essential services or pursue clearly de ned Any decision should therefore be based on the appropriate arrangements in place to preserve
a government-wide ownership policy, while only public policy objectives. The critical issue is how that enterprise’s mandate, performance, market essential services. This approach can also give
42% report functional separation between support is designed and disclosed. The OECD conditions, scal implications and the availability of prospective investors greater clarity over
ownership and policymaking or regulatory Guidelines call for SOEs’ economic activities to alternative mechanisms for delivering the public commercial objectives, liabilities and the respective
responsibilities. operate on a level playing eld with private policy objective, rather than on short-term scal roles of the state and the SOE.
competitors. This means avoiding ownership-based considerations alone.
The OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of regulatory or tax advantages, ensuring nancing is ICMA: How can Pakistan—and similar
State-Owned Enterprises (“OECD Guidelines”) consistent with market principles for commercial Good corporate governance can also contribute to developing economies undergoing active
therefore emphasise a clear allocation of activities, making state support transparent, and broader development objectives, including capital economic restructuring — e ectively institutionalize
responsibilities and, as far as possible, separation of clearly identifying the costs associated with public market development, by creating an enabling competitive neutrality, robust anti-corruption
the state’s ownership function from functions that service obligations. Separate accounting for environment for SOEs to access market-based integrity frameworks, and independent external
could a ect market conditions. Where complete commercial and public-service activities, coupled nancing, alongside wider e orts to strengthen the audit practices (such as mandatory audit rm
institutional separation is not feasible, clear with compensation proportionate to the cost of capital market ecosystem. rotation) to build investor trust and ensure a
mandates, internal separation and independent ful lling those public service obligations, is ICMA: In emerging market economies like level playing eld?
regulatory functions can provide important particularly important in reducing the risk of Pakistan, where scal de cits are tightly linked Carmine Di Noia: Investor con dence depends not
safeguards. to loss-making commercial SOEs, what only on the ownership model, but on whether SOEs
distortive cross-subsidisation. The objective is not to
would
you
At enterprise level, professional and transparent prevent legitimate public intervention, but to immediate sequencing steps from ad-hoc operate within credible, transparent and predictable
to
transition
recommend
governance frameworks. The OECD framework
board nomination processes, appropriate ensure that it is transparent, proportionate and does administrative bailouts to a centralized, points to three mutually reinforcing priorities:
competency and independence requirements, not unnecessarily distort competition. professionalized ownership policy that applying comparable legal and regulatory
con ict-of-interest safeguards and su cient board ICMA: In light of shifting global macroeconomic successfully attracts private capital through conditions to SOEs and private rms where they
authority and autonomy are equally important in pressures, what criteria should guide a privatization without disrupting essential public undertake economic activities; embedding integrity
enabling boards to exercise objective judgement government's decision to pursue full-scale service obligations? through risk-based compliance systems,
and limiting undue political in uence.
privatization versus retaining state ownership Carmine Di Noia: For Pakistan, as for any economy con ict-of-interest safeguards, whistleblower
ICMA: When statutory exemptions or indirect through structured capital frameworks and undertaking signi cant SOE reform, sequencing protection and transparent, merit-based
ICMA: Given that global SOEs command a Governments can strengthen capital discipline by state support soften hard budget constraints for performance-based management? matters and reforms need to re ect national appointments; and subjecting SOEs to high-quality
massive footprint of USD 141 trillion in assets yet setting clear commercial and non-commercial commercial SOEs, how can international independent external audit and disclosure
lag behind private peers in pro tability and carry objectives, monitoring performance against Carmine Di Noia: I would say that what matters is circumstances and public-service requirements. A standards.
higher leverage, what policy instruments should measurable targets, establishing appropriate standards better enforce competitive neutrality whether there is a clear and transparent rationale for sound starting point is to establish the rationale for
ownership entities deploy to enforce capital rate-of-return expectations where relevant, and to ensure private market competitors are not state ownership. state ownership of each enterprise and distinguish The 2026 evidence shows that independent external
discipline and bridge this performance gap adopting dividend policies that take account of disadvantaged? commercial activities from public service audit is already widespread internationally, with
without compromising essential public policy investment needs, nancial sustainability and an Governments should periodically assess whether obligations. This can support the development of a 93% of surveyed jurisdictions applying it to some or
mandate? appropriate capital structure. Carmine Di Noia: There can be legitimate reasons ownership continues to serve an identi able public coherent ownership policy, clearer allocation of all SOEs, while a majority also require audit- rm
Carmine Di Noia: State-owned enterprises play a Crucially, public service obligations should be for governments to support SOEs or other market interest, such as delivering essential services, ownership responsibilities, and stronger rotation. Rotation can reinforce auditor
major role in the global economy. According to our clearly identi ed, transparently costed and participants, particularly when they are required to
latest OECD report Ownership and Governance of adequately compensated, so that boards and addressing market failures, safeguarding strategic portfolio-level monitoring and reporting. independence, but it should form part of a broader
ownership entities can distinguish the cost of
State-Owned Enterprises 2026, their economic achieving public policy objectives from underlying interests or managing critical Once these foundations are in place, governments system that includes strong audit committees,
footprint has doubled over the past decade, so commercial performance. infrastructure, and whether state internal controls, transparent nancial reporting
ensuring they are well governed is increasingly ownership is the most e ective are better positioned to assess enterprise by and e ective follow-up on audit ndings. For
important. ICMA: With less than half of surveyed way of achieving that objective. enterprise whether restructuring, continued Pakistan and other reforming economies, building
consolidated
jurisdictions
maintaining
a
Pro tability alone is not a su cient measure of SOE ownership policy and only 42% achieving a strict ownership, private participation or divestment these elements consistently across commercially
performance, because many SOEs are also expected functional separation between ownership, Where ownership is retained, the o ers the best long-term outcome, while putting signi cant SOEs can help strengthen accountability,
to deliver essential services or other public policy policymaking, and regulation, how can focus should be on professional improve the credibility of nancial information and
objectives. That said, the OECD’s latest evidence governments e ectively mitigate con icts of governance, clear performance
shows that, across the six industries examined interest and protect SOE boards from undue create a more predictable environment for private
(energy, nance, transport, telecommunications, political in uence? expectations, appropriate capital investment.
manufacturing and other utilities), SOEs have on Carmine Di Noia: There has been meaningful progress structures and e ective boards.
average been less pro table and more leveraged in professionalising state ownership, but the evidence Where the original rationale no
than comparable private rms, which reinforces the also shows scope to strengthen institutional longer applies, divestment,
importance of active and professional state arrangements further.
ownership. including partial privatisation, can
be considered alongside other
options.
ICMA’s Chartered Management Accountant, Sep-Oct 2026 5

