Page 11 - CMA Journal (Sep-Oct 2026)
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E x c lus iv e  I nt er v iew



 Only 43% of surveyed jurisdictions have developed   provide essential services or pursue clearly de ned   Any decision should therefore be based on the   appropriate arrangements in place to preserve
 a government-wide ownership policy, while only   public policy objectives. The critical issue is how that   enterprise’s  mandate,  performance,  market  essential services.  This approach can also give
 42%  report  functional  separation  between  support is designed and disclosed.  The OECD   conditions,  scal implications and the availability of   prospective  investors  greater  clarity  over
 ownership and policymaking   or   regulatory   Guidelines call for SOEs’ economic activities to   alternative mechanisms for delivering the public   commercial objectives, liabilities and the respective
 responsibilities.  operate on a level playing  eld with private   policy objective, rather than on short-term  scal   roles of the state and the SOE.
 competitors. This means avoiding ownership-based   considerations alone.
 The OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of   regulatory or tax advantages, ensuring  nancing is   ICMA:  How  can  Pakistan—and  similar
 State-Owned Enterprises (“OECD Guidelines”)   consistent with market principles for commercial   Good corporate governance can also contribute to   developing  economies  undergoing  active
 therefore emphasise a clear allocation  of   activities, making state support transparent, and   broader development objectives, including capital   economic restructuring — e ectively institutionalize
 responsibilities and, as far as possible, separation of   clearly identifying the costs associated with public   market development, by creating an enabling   competitive neutrality, robust anti-corruption
 the state’s ownership function from functions that   service obligations. Separate accounting for   environment for SOEs to access market-based   integrity frameworks, and independent external
 could a ect market conditions.  Where complete   commercial and public-service activities, coupled    nancing, alongside wider e orts to strengthen the   audit practices (such as mandatory audit  rm
 institutional  separation  is  not  feasible,  clear   with compensation proportionate to the cost of   capital market ecosystem.  rotation) to build investor trust and ensure a
 mandates, internal separation and independent   ful lling those public service obligations, is   ICMA: In emerging market economies like   level playing  eld?
 regulatory functions can provide important   particularly important in reducing the risk of   Pakistan, where  scal de cits are tightly linked   Carmine Di Noia: Investor con dence depends not
 safeguards.   to  loss-making    commercial    SOEs,    what   only on the ownership model, but on whether SOEs
 distortive cross-subsidisation. The objective is not to
                                                 would
                                                          you
 At enterprise level, professional and transparent   prevent legitimate public intervention, but to   immediate  sequencing  steps  from  ad-hoc  operate within credible, transparent and predictable
                             to
                                  transition
               recommend
                                                                governance  frameworks.  The OECD  framework
 board  nomination  processes,  appropriate  ensure that it is transparent, proportionate and does   administrative  bailouts  to  a  centralized,  points to three mutually reinforcing priorities:
 competency and independence requirements,   not unnecessarily distort competition.  professionalized  ownership  policy  that  applying  comparable  legal  and  regulatory
 con ict-of-interest safeguards and su cient board   ICMA: In light of shifting global macroeconomic   successfully attracts private capital through   conditions to SOEs and private  rms where they
 authority and autonomy are equally important in   pressures, what criteria should guide a   privatization without disrupting essential public   undertake economic activities; embedding integrity
 enabling boards to exercise objective judgement   government's decision  to  pursue  full-scale   service obligations?  through  risk-based  compliance  systems,
 and limiting undue political in uence.
 privatization versus retaining state ownership   Carmine Di Noia: For Pakistan, as for any economy   con ict-of-interest  safeguards,  whistleblower
 ICMA:  When statutory exemptions or indirect   through structured capital frameworks and   undertaking signi cant SOE reform, sequencing   protection  and  transparent,  merit-based
 ICMA: Given that global SOEs command a   Governments can strengthen capital discipline by   state support soften hard budget constraints for   performance-based management?  appointments; and subjecting SOEs to high-quality
 massive footprint of USD 141 trillion in assets yet   setting clear commercial and non-commercial   commercial SOEs, how can international   matters and reforms need to re ect national   independent  external  audit  and  disclosure
 lag behind private peers in pro tability and carry   objectives,  monitoring  performance  against  Carmine Di Noia: I would say that what matters is   circumstances and public-service requirements. A   standards.
 higher leverage, what policy instruments should   measurable  targets,  establishing  appropriate  standards better enforce competitive neutrality   whether there is a clear and transparent rationale for   sound starting point is to establish the rationale for
 ownership entities deploy to enforce capital   rate-of-return expectations where relevant, and   to ensure private market competitors are not   state ownership.   state ownership of each enterprise and distinguish   The 2026 evidence shows that independent external
 discipline and bridge this performance gap   adopting dividend policies that take account of   disadvantaged?  commercial  activities  from  public  service  audit is already widespread internationally, with
 without compromising essential public policy   investment needs,  nancial sustainability and an   Governments should periodically assess whether   obligations. This can support the development of a   93% of surveyed jurisdictions applying it to some or
 mandate?  appropriate capital structure.   Carmine Di Noia: There can be legitimate reasons   ownership continues to serve an identi able public   coherent ownership policy, clearer allocation of   all SOEs, while a majority also require audit- rm
 Carmine Di Noia: State-owned enterprises play a   Crucially, public service obligations should be   for governments to support SOEs or other market   interest, such as delivering essential services,   ownership  responsibilities,  and  stronger  rotation.  Rotation  can  reinforce  auditor
 major role in the global economy. According to our   clearly identi ed, transparently costed and   participants, particularly when they are required to
 latest OECD report Ownership and Governance of   adequately compensated, so that boards and   addressing market failures, safeguarding strategic   portfolio-level monitoring and reporting.   independence, but it should form part of a broader
 State-Owned Enterprises 2026, their economic   ownership entities can distinguish the cost of   interests or managing  critical   Once these foundations are in place, governments   system that includes strong audit committees,
 achieving public policy objectives from underlying
 footprint  has  doubled  over  the  past  decade,  so   commercial performance.  infrastructure, and whether state   internal controls,  transparent  nancial reporting
 ensuring they are well governed is increasingly   ownership is the most e ective   are  better  positioned  to assess enterprise by   and e ective follow-up on audit  ndings. For
 important.   ICMA:  With less than half of surveyed   way of achieving that objective.   enterprise  whether  restructuring,  continued  Pakistan and other reforming economies, building
 Pro tability alone is not a su cient measure of SOE   jurisdictions  maintaining  a  consolidated  ownership, private participation or divestment   these elements consistently across commercially
 ownership policy and only 42% achieving a strict
 performance, because many SOEs are also expected   functional separation between ownership,   Where ownership is retained, the   o ers the best long-term outcome, while putting   signi cant SOEs can help strengthen accountability,
 to deliver essential services or other public policy   policymaking,  and  regulation,  how  can  focus should be on professional   improve the credibility of  nancial information and
 objectives.  That said, the OECD’s latest evidence   governments e ectively mitigate con icts of         The objective is not to prevent
 shows  that,  across  the  six  industries  examined   interest and protect SOE boards from undue   governance, clear performance   create a more predictable environment for private
 (energy,  nance, transport, telecommunications,   political in uence?  expectations, appropriate capital   legitimate public intervention,   investment.
 manufacturing and other utilities), SOEs have on   Carmine Di Noia: There has been meaningful progress   structures and e ective boards.   but to ensure that it is
 average been less pro table and more leveraged   in professionalising state ownership, but the evidence   Where the original rationale no
 than comparable private  rms, which reinforces the   also shows scope  to strengthen  institutional   longer  applies,  divestment,  transparent, proportionate   The Editorial Board thanks  Mr. Carmine Di Noia, Director,
 importance of active and professional state   arrangements further.   and does not unnecessarily   Financial and Enterprise A airs, Organisation for Economic
 ownership.   including partial privatisation, can              Co-operation and Development (OECD) for sparing his
 be  considered alongside other   distort competition.          precious time to give an  exclusive interview for Chartered
 options.                                                       Management Accountant Journal.
               6    ICMA’s Chartered Management Accountant, Sep-Oct 2026
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