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F oc us S ec t ion
Privatised entities should not continue to depend on professional boards, greater managerial autonomy and Policy Priorities References
preferential treatment, implicit subsidies or market clearer accountability.
protection. Where an enterprise is fundamentally An important institutional development is the The following measures can help translate the reform • Finance Division, Government of Pakistan. (2025). Federal
unviable, liquidation may also need to be considered establishment of the Central Monitoring Unit (CMU) agenda into measurable results: State-Owned Enterprises Annual Aggregate Report, FY2025.
rather than repeatedly committing public resources to within the Finance Division. Its role includes • Strengthen SOE governance: Ensure quali ed • Faraz, N., & Samad, G. (2022). Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) in
an unsuccessful sale process. Post-Privatization: Evidence from Pakistan. Journal of Applied
monitoring SOE nancial performance, assessing independent boards, clear mandates and greater Economics, 25(1), 1239–1259.
The power sector presents another major test. The operational risks and evaluating nancial and operational autonomy under the SOE Act 2023. https://doi.org/10.1080/15140326.2022.2104553
Introduction Although these privatisation process for IESCO, FESCO and GEPCO has quasi- scal implications. The integrated digital • Link funding to performance: Make government • Megginson, W. L., & Netter, J. M. (2001). From State to Market: A
developments indicate been initiated, while further distribution companies reporting platform further supports standardised data nancial support conditional on measurable Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization. Journal of Economic
Pakistan’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are at a progress, they do not are expected to follow. However, the government must collection and performance monitoring (Finance
critical stage. Despite this footprint, many continue to eliminate the underlying rst address circular debt arrangements and Division, 2025). nancial and operational targets, including ROIC Literature, 39(2), 321–389. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.39.2.321
place pressure on public nances, with accumulated structural weaknesses. outstanding nancial obligations to ensure that these However, implementation remains critical. SOE boards and EVA. • State Bank of Pakistan. (2024). Annual Report 2023–2024: Chapter 7
losses reaching Rs. 7.22 trillion. The portfolio’s thin net Sustainable improvement liabilities do not continue to undermine the nancial must comprise quali ed and independent • Adopt a di erentiated ownership strategy: – Reforming State-Owned Enterprises in Pakistan.
pro t of Rs. 80.5 billion masks an unrecognized balance position of the companies after privatisation (Pro t by professionals with the authority to make commercial Identify entities suitable for privatisation, PPPs, • Daily Times. (2026, January 3). Lessons from PIA's privatisation go
sheet risk of up to Rs. 2.5–3.5 trillion from unfunded will require better Pakistan Today, 2026). decisions without unnecessary administrative concessions or continued state ownership. far beyond the sale price.
nancial management,
pensions and IFRS gaps as per H1-FY2026 report. Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) • Pro t by Pakistan Today. (2026, August 31). CCoP seeks alternative
commercial discipline interference. Political and bureaucratic involvement in • Address legacy liabilities: Resolve outstanding
The issue extends beyond nancial losses. Continued and accountability Not every SOE requires a complete transfer of routine management can weaken accountability and debt, pension obligations and sector-speci c to circular debt nancing ahead of DISCO privatisation.
government support absorbs scarce scal resources, rather than continued discourage capable professionals from serving on nancial weaknesses before privatisation. • Pro t by Pakistan Today. (2026, September 15). SOEs report
while ine cient operations and limited competition reliance on government ownership. Public-private partnerships o er an boards. Rs342.8bn loss in H1 FY26.
alternative where the government wishes to retain
constrain private-sector participation. Pakistan’s SOE support. Equally important is the transparent treatment of • Formalise public service obligations: Cost, • The Nation. (2025, July 14). Finance ministry proposes
reform agenda, therefore, needs to move beyond Privatisation: ownership while engaging private-sector expertise, Public Service Obligations (PSOs). Some SOEs provide contract and transparently nance all performance-linked funding model for state-owned enterprises.
reducing losses towards improving governance, Moving Beyond a Change of investment and operational capacity. services that may not be commercially viable but non-commercial services provided by SOEs. • The News on Sunday. (2026, January 4). Privatisation vs
operational e ciency and economic value creation. Ownership This approach is particularly relevant to infrastructure, remain essential for public welfare. Such obligations • Improve market competition: Strengthen public-private partnership.
The State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and transport, energy and public-service delivery. should be clearly de ned, costed and funded through regulatory oversight and ensure that privatised • World Bank. (2023). Reducing the Fiscal Impact of State-Owned
Operations) Act, 2023, the SOE Ownership and Privatisation remains an important component of Pakistan's airport management initiatives illustrate this explicit government allocations rather than being enterprises operate under fair and competitive Enterprises: Pakistan Public Expenditure Review 2023.
Management Policy 2023, and the government's Pakistan's SOE reform strategy. The government has distinction: rather than selling Karachi, Lahore and concealed within operating losses. This would allow conditions. • https://www. nance.gov.pk/publications/FY_2026_SOE_
privatisation programme provide a framework for this identi ed up to 50 entities for privatisation over the Islamabad airports, the government has considered enterprises to distinguish commercial performance Biannual_Report%20_6%20Months.pdf
transition. The central question is how privatisation next three to four years, with the process covering long-term concession arrangements to improve from the cost of delivering public services. • Expand digital monitoring: Use the CMU's
and public-private partnerships (PPPs), supported by energy distribution companies, aviation and other operational e ciency and service standards. Turning Reform into Economic Value reporting platform to improve transparency, track
stronger governance, can help transform SOEs from commercial enterprises. Similarly, PPPs can support investment in energy performance and identify nancial risks.
scal liabilities into productive economic entities. However, Pakistan's experience demonstrates that infrastructure, including battery energy storage Pakistan's SOE reform agenda requires a di erentiated Conclusion
Understanding the Scale of the transferring ownership alone does not guarantee systems, without requiring the government to nance approach rather than a uniform ownership model. Pakistan's SOE challenge is no longer simply about
Commercially viable entities operating in competitive
Challenge improved performance. Research on post-privatisation the entire investment.
enterprises has found mixed results, with some rms markets may be suitable for full privatisation. reducing nancial losses; it is about ensuring that
The FY2025 SOE report presents a mixed picture of the recording insigni cant or negative performance The distinction between privatisation and PPPs is Enterprises requiring substantial investment or public assets generate sustainable economic and
sector. The portfolio's return on invested capital (ROIC) changes (Faraz & Samad, 2022). Similarly, lengthy important. Privatisation transfers ownership, whereas specialised management may bene t from social returns. The reforms introduced through the SOE
stood at approximately 2.2%, substantially below its transaction processes and institutional weaknesses PPPs establish contractual arrangements through concessions and PPPs, while strategically important Act 2023, the privatisation programme and the
estimated weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of have a ected the pace and e ectiveness of earlier which private partners may nance, develop, operate entities may remain under state ownership with growing use of PPPs provide an opportunity to address
around 15%. The resulting negative EVA indicates that initiatives. or manage public assets. The choice should depend on stronger governance and performance requirements. long-standing weaknesses.
the portfolio is not generating su cient returns to The privatisation of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) the commercial viability, strategic importance and Government nancial support should also be linked to However, the success of these initiatives will depend
cover the cost of capital invested in it (Finance Division, o ers important lessons. Before the transaction, the service-delivery requirements of each enterprise. measurable outcomes, including return on invested on implementation. Privatisation without competition,
2025). capital, EVA, cost recovery and operational e ciency. A
government absorbed more than Rs.670 billion in A transparent project-selection process, appropriate PPPs without e ective risk allocation, and state
Nevertheless, recent gures suggest some marginal liabilities and debt, transferring a substantial part of risk allocation, competitive bidding and e ective performance-linked funding framework would help ownership without professional governance will o er
ensure that public resources support restructuring and
improvement. During the rst half of FY2026, the historical nancial burden to taxpayers (Daily contract monitoring will be essential to ensure that measurable improvements rather than perpetuating limited improvements. A coordinated approach
pro table SOEs generated gains of Rs. 423.3 billion, Times, 2026). This highlights the importance of PPPs deliver value rather than create new contingent recurring losses (The Nation, 2025). combining nancial discipline, independent oversight,
while loss-making entities recorded losses of Rs. 342.8 addressing legacy liabilities, operational ine ciencies liabilities for the government. operational restructuring and transparent
billion. This resulted in a narrow net adjusted pro t of and governance weaknesses before transferring Governance: The Foundation of In the energy sector, reducing circular debt requires public-service funding is essential.
Rs. 80.5 billion for the sector. Consequently, the net ownership. Sustainable Reform sustained attention to cost recovery, operational Ultimately, the performance of Pakistan's SOEs should
scal ow to the government—representing the The objective should not simply be to sell an enterprise e ciency, metering infrastructure and improved be measured not by their size or the scale of
di erence between SOE contributions and but to establish a commercially viable business Ownership changes and private-sector participation nancial settlements between distribution companies government support they receive, but by their
government support—stood at approximately Rs. 35.8 operating under transparent rules and genuine cannot deliver lasting results without e ective and power producers. Temporary nancial contribution to productivity, service delivery, scal
billion as per H1-FY2026 report. competition. governance. The SOE Act, 2023 and Ownership and arrangements alone cannot resolve the structural sustainability and national economic value.
weaknesses responsible for recurring liabilities.
Management Policy, 2023 provide a framework for
ICMA’s Chartered Management Accountant, Sep-Oct 2026 49

