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F oc us S ec t ion
The government acts as shareholder without directing ownership. Employee transition arrangements also The case illustrates how strategic private investment ca
Table 2: Financial Performance and Fiscal Returns of SOEs individual investment decisions, while the board oversees addressed the protection of wages and retirement strengthen a capital-intensive enterprise while allowing
Indicator (PKR billion) Jul–Dec 2024 Jul–Dec 2025 Change investment strategy, portfolio performance and bene ts. the state to retain minority ownership. However, the P
success of such arrangements depends on clear
corporate governance. Investment decisions are made
Aggregate revenue 6,459.2 6,264.8 −3% independently, subject to constitutional safeguards Malaysia: Government-Linked Companies shareholder agreements, e ective regulation and
Transformation Programme
Aggregate profits 457.2 423.3 −7% protecting national reserves. This model separates state Malaysia’s Government-Linked Companies (GLC) safeguards for public interests. Interna
should
Aggregate losses 342.9 342.8 Almost unchanged ownership from day-to-day management, promoting Transformation Programme (2005–2015) o ers a South Africa: South African Airways – Financial and ap
Net profit 114.3 80.5 −30% professional accountability and long-term value creation. structured model for improving the performance of Operational Restructuring enterpr
Government fiscal support 616.0 804.0 +31% Brazil: Vale: Privatisation of a Commercially Oriented state-linked enterprises without relying solely on South African Airways (SAA) entered business rescue in
Enterprise
The Fiscal Cost of State Ownership group of enterprises, while major losses are concentrated SOE contributions to government 1,043.0 839.8 −19% Brazil’s Vale, formerly Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, privatisation. Led by the Putrajaya Committee on GLC December 2019 after years of nancial and operational
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) play an important role in in infrastructure, transport and electricity distribution. Net fiscal flow 427.0 35.8 −92% illustrates ownership restructuring through privatisation. High Performance, the programme focused on board di culties. Its restructuring involved cost reduction, d
renegotiation, workforce rationalisation, balance-sheet
Pakistan’s economy by providing essential services and The contrast between pro table and loss-making power Net Return on equity (ROE) 1.67% 1.26% −0.41 percentage points Established as a state-owned mining enterprise, it was e ectiveness, professional management, procurement,
supporting strategic sectors. However, their continued distribution companies also suggests that reforms should privatised in May 1997 through a public auction at the Rio capital allocation, human resource development and restructuring and the return of leased aircraft. The
relevance depends on the economic and social value they consider entity-level performance rather than apply a Net Return on assets (ROA) 0.30% 0.22% −0.08 percentage points de Janeiro Stock Exchange. The Brazil Consortium, led by operational e ciency. It introduced measurable key government provided approximately ZAR 24.9 billion in
deliver against public resources consumed. Declining uniform sector-wide approach. Source: Federal State-Owned Enterprises Bi-Annual Report, H1-FY2026, Finance Division, Government of Pakistan. Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, acquired 41.73% of its performance indicators (KPIs), performance-linked nancial support, enabling the airline to exit business
pro tability, rising scal support and uneven Financial Performance and the voting shares, shifting the company from state to compensation and stronger management accountability. rescue in 2021. The case highlights the role of formal
performance highlight concerns about their nancial Deteriorating Fiscal Return • Sharp decline in net scal returns: Net scal ow The programme also encouraged clearer de nition of restructuring in addressing accumulated liabilities
sustainability, governance and e ectiveness. contracted signi cantly due to higher government (SOEs). Between 2020 and 2025, all ve governance private-sector control. This was followed by international social obligations and the divestment of non-core or operational ine ciencies. However, the scale of public
Pakistan’s SOE portfolio is facing an increasing gap expansion, demonstrating how privatisation can reshape support and subsequent governance challenges
The OECD’s Guidelines on Corporate Governance of between nancial performance and scal obligations. support and lower SOE contributions. indicators deteriorated, particularly political stability, rule investment incentives and commercial performance. The unpro table assets. This approach strengthened underline the need to combine nancial restructuring
State-Owned Enterprises 2024 o er a framework for Aggregate revenue declined by 3% during • Declining returns on investment: Lower ROE and of law, and regulatory quality. The decline in control of case also highlights the importance of transparent commercial discipline while retaining government with operational sustainability and stronger corporate
reform, emphasising clear ownership objectives, July–December 2025, while net pro t fell by nearly 30%. ROA indicate reduced returns relative to shareholders’ corruption also raises concerns about the institutional valuation, competitive bidding, regulatory oversight and ownership and strategic oversight. oversight to secure long-term viability. Table 5 shows k
accountable boards, operational autonomy, transparent On the other hand, government support increased by funds and assets, raising concerns about capital safeguards needed to ensure transparent procurement, safeguards when transferring strategic public assets. Romania: OMV Petrom – Strategic Private-Sector
disclosure and explicit funding of public-service 31%, whereas contributions from SOEs declined by 19%. productivity and the e ectiveness of public e ective oversight and accountability in public Participation with Retained State Ownership lessons for Pakistan based on international practices.
obligations. Pakistan needs a di erentiated, As a result, the portfolio’s net scal ow contracted investment. enterprises. These trends do not demonstrate that India: Ordnance Factory Board – Corporatisation
performance-based approach that considers each SOE’s sharply, indicating that the government is receiving Despite strong nancial-sector growth and higher oil and governance weaknesses directly caused SOE nancial under State Ownership Romania’s privatisation of Petrom in 2004 demonstrates a
commercial viability, strategic importance and substantially lower net scal returns despite committing gas pro ts, total SOE revenue declined by 3.0% and losses; rather, they suggest that SOEs operate within an India’s restructuring of the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) mixed-ownership model involving a strategic private
public-service role. greater public resources. aggregate pro t fell by 29.5%. The power sector's shift to institutional environment that may complicate the Total government in ows from SOEs declined by 19.5%, strategy re ects the enterprise's nancial position, demonstrates how corporatisation can improve SOE investor. Austria’s OMV acquired a controlling 51.01%
Concentration of Pro tability and • Weakening earnings position: Net pro t declined a loss and persistent infrastructure de cits underscore implementation of commercial reforms, investment from PKR 1,043.0 billion to PKR 839.8 billion, while scal commercial viability, strategic importance and performance without privatisation. In October 2021, the stake through a combination of share acquisition and a
decisions and performance monitoring. The relevance of
Losses Across SOEs despite largely unchanged aggregate losses, how concentrated sectoral losses continue to erode this institutional context becomes clearer when support to SOEs increased by 30.5%, from PKR 616.0 public-service obligations. Countries have adopted government reorganised the former departmental capital increase, investing approximately EUR 1.5 billion in
overall pro tability, reinforcing the need for targeted
the transaction. The Romanian state retained a 20.7%
The top ten pro t-making and loss-making SOEs show indicating a deterioration in the portfolio’s overall restructuring, stronger accountability, and sector-speci c considered alongside SOE nancial results for the rst half billion to PKR 804.0 billion. Consequently, the net scal di erent approaches, ranging from professionalised state structure into seven wholly government-owned Defence stake, while the remaining shares were held by pension
ownership and corporatisation to private-sector
that pro tability is concentrated among a relatively small earnings performance. performance benchmarks. of FY2026. The 29.5% decline in SOE net pro t, alongside ow to the government fell sharply by 91.6%, from PKR participation, performance-based governance and Public Sector Undertakings, bringing 41 production units funds, individual investors and other shareholders. The
under separate corporate entities. These included Yantra
427.0 billion to PKR 35.8 billion. Although dividends and
Pakistan’s Governance Indicators and a 30.5% increase in government scal support during H1 tax receipts increased, lower non-tax revenue and interest nancial restructuring. India Limited, Munitions India Limited and Armoured investment provided capital for modernisation,
FY2026, highlights the need for stronger nancial
Their Relevance to SOE Performance discipline and accountability. receipts reduced overall in ows. This widening gap Singapore: Temasek Holdings Vehicles Nigam Limited. The reform aimed to strengthen expansion and operational development, while bringing Referen
private-sector management expertise and technology
operational autonomy, e ciency, innovation and
H1 F
Pakistan's Worldwide Governance Indicators provide an Furthermore, the scal relationship between state-owned between government receipts and nancial support Singapore’s Temasek Holdings, established in 1974, commercial accountability while retaining state into the company. • (2)
important institutional context for assessing the enterprises (SOEs) and the government weakened highlights the growing scal burden of SOEs and demonstrates a professional approach to state ownership the
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performance and reform of state-owned enterprises signi cantly in the rst half of FY2026. reinforces the need for stronger nancial discipline, through an independent investment holding structure. Mont
OECD
improved operational performance, and targeted reforms Wholly owned by the Singapore Minister for Finance, it • 202
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Table 3: Sector-wise Revenue and Pro tability to reduce reliance on public resources. operates as a commercial investment company with its • • in
own board and management.
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Sector (PKR billion) Revenue Revenue Profit/(loss) Profit/(loss) H1 Identi ed Challenges • comp
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H1 FY2025 H1 FY2026 H1 FY2025 FY2026 The evidence in Figure 1, highlights four • inve
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Financial 308.1 527.6 45.5 75.0 interconnected challenges shaping Pakistan’s • Prog
SOE reform agenda. These challenges call for a
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Infrastructure, Transport and ITC 387.1 378.2 −160.8 −153.8 di erentiated SOE reform framework based on • • sa
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Manufacturing, Mining and Engineering 16.2 18.2 −8.4 −7.1 nancial viability, strategic importance, and • airw
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Oil and Gas 3,466.5 3,296.8 178.2 191.3 public-service obligations, combining ente
year
performance-based autonomy, time-bound
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Power 2,168.0 1,963.5 68.2 −23.9 restructuring, transparent public-service • annu
Industrial Estate Development 4.8 4.3 1.4 1.5 funding, and credible exit mechanisms. • • ht
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Trading and Marketing 97.9 61.3 −9.5 −5.0 Global Case Studies: • • ht
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Miscellaneous 10.6 14.9 −0.4 2.6 Transformation of State-Owned • 20au
Total 6,459.2 6,264.8 114.3 80.5 Enterprises • • ht
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Sources: H1 FY2025 report, pp. 26–27; H1 FY2026 report, pp. 26–27. bi_annual_report_2025 (2).pdf; FY_2026_SOE_Biannual_Report _6 Months (1).pdf. Note: International experience demonstrates that SOE Prog
Change compares the same six-month period in both years. reform is most e ective when the restructuring • http
52 ICMA’s Chartered Management Accountant, Sep-Oct 2026

