Page 55 - CMA Journal (Sep-Oct 2026)
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F oc us  S ec t ion



 Privatised entities should not continue to depend on   professional boards, greater managerial autonomy and   Policy Priorities  References
 preferential  treatment,  implicit  subsidies  or  market   clearer accountability.
 protection.  Where an enterprise is fundamentally   An important institutional development is the   The following measures can help translate the reform   •   Finance Division, Government of Pakistan. (2025). Federal
 unviable, liquidation may also need to be considered   establishment of the Central Monitoring Unit (CMU)   agenda into measurable results:  State-Owned Enterprises Annual Aggregate Report, FY2025.
 rather than repeatedly committing public resources to   within the Finance Division. Its role includes   •  Strengthen SOE governance: Ensure quali ed   •   Faraz,  N.,  &  Samad,  G.  (2022).  Public  Sector  Enterprises  (PSEs)  in
 an unsuccessful sale process.                                      Post-Privatization: Evidence from Pakistan. Journal of Applied
 monitoring SOE  nancial performance, assessing   independent boards, clear mandates and greater   Economics,  25(1),  1239–1259.
 The power  sector  presents another  major test.  The   operational risks and evaluating  nancial and   operational autonomy under the SOE Act 2023.  https://doi.org/10.1080/15140326.2022.2104553
 Introduction  Although  these  privatisation process for IESCO, FESCO and GEPCO has   quasi- scal implications.  The integrated digital   •  Link funding to performance: Make government   •   Megginson, W. L., & Netter, J. M. (2001). From State to Market: A
 developments indicate   been initiated, while further distribution companies   reporting platform further supports standardised data    nancial support conditional on measurable   Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization. Journal of Economic
 Pakistan’s  state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs)  are  at a   progress, they do  not   are expected to follow. However, the government must   collection and  performance  monitoring  (Finance
 critical stage. Despite this footprint, many continue to   eliminate the underlying    rst address circular debt arrangements and   Division, 2025).   nancial and operational targets, including ROIC   Literature, 39(2), 321–389. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.39.2.321
 place  pressure on  public   nances, with  accumulated   structural weaknesses.   outstanding  nancial obligations to ensure that these   However, implementation remains critical. SOE boards   and EVA.  •   State Bank of Pakistan. (2024). Annual Report 2023–2024: Chapter 7
 losses reaching Rs. 7.22 trillion. The portfolio’s thin net   Sustainable improvement   liabilities do not continue to undermine the  nancial   must  comprise  quali ed  and  independent  •  Adopt a di erentiated ownership strategy:   – Reforming State-Owned Enterprises in Pakistan.
 pro t of Rs. 80.5 billion masks an unrecognized balance   position of the companies after privatisation (Pro t by   professionals with the authority to make commercial   Identify entities suitable for privatisation, PPPs,   •   Daily Times. (2026, January 3). Lessons from PIA's privatisation go
 sheet risk of up to Rs. 2.5–3.5 trillion from unfunded   will  require  better  Pakistan Today, 2026).  decisions  without  unnecessary  administrative  concessions or continued state ownership.  far beyond the sale price.
  nancial management,
 pensions and IFRS gaps as per H1-FY2026 report.  Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)  •   Pro t by Pakistan Today. (2026, August 31). CCoP seeks alternative
 commercial  discipline  interference. Political and bureaucratic involvement in   •  Address legacy liabilities: Resolve outstanding
 The issue extends beyond  nancial losses. Continued   and  accountability  Not  every  SOE  requires  a  complete  transfer  of   routine management can weaken accountability and   debt, pension obligations and sector-speci c   to circular debt  nancing ahead of DISCO privatisation.
 government support absorbs scarce  scal resources,   rather than continued   discourage capable professionals from serving on    nancial weaknesses before privatisation.  •   Pro t by Pakistan  Today. (2026, September 15). SOEs report
 while ine cient operations and limited competition   reliance on government   ownership.  Public-private partnerships  o er an   boards.  Rs342.8bn loss in H1 FY26.
 alternative where the government wishes to retain
 constrain private-sector participation. Pakistan’s SOE   support.  Equally important  is  the  transparent  treatment  of   •  Formalise public service obligations: Cost,   •   The Nation. (2025, July 14). Finance ministry proposes
 reform agenda, therefore, needs to move beyond   Privatisation:   ownership while engaging private-sector expertise,   Public Service Obligations (PSOs). Some SOEs provide   contract and transparently  nance all   performance-linked funding model for state-owned enterprises.
 reducing losses towards improving governance,   Moving Beyond a Change of   investment and operational capacity.  services that may not be commercially viable but   non-commercial services provided by SOEs.  •   The News on Sunday. (2026, January 4). Privatisation vs
 operational e ciency and economic value creation.  Ownership  This approach is particularly relevant to infrastructure,   remain essential for public welfare. Such obligations   •  Improve market competition: Strengthen   public-private partnership.
 The State-Owned Enterprises  (Governance  and   transport, energy and public-service delivery.   should be clearly de ned, costed and funded through   regulatory oversight and ensure that privatised   •   World Bank. (2023). Reducing the Fiscal Impact of State-Owned
 Operations)  Act,  2023,  the  SOE  Ownership  and   Privatisation  remains an important component of   Pakistan's airport management initiatives illustrate this   explicit  government  allocations  rather  than  being   enterprises operate under fair and competitive   Enterprises: Pakistan Public Expenditure Review 2023.
 Management Policy 2023, and the government's   Pakistan's  SOE  reform  strategy. The  government  has   distinction: rather than selling Karachi, Lahore and   concealed within operating losses. This would allow   conditions.  •  https://www. nance.gov.pk/publications/FY_2026_SOE_
 privatisation programme provide a framework for this   identi ed up to 50 entities for privatisation over the   Islamabad airports, the government has considered   enterprises to distinguish commercial performance   Biannual_Report%20_6%20Months.pdf
 transition.  The central question is how privatisation   next three to four years, with the process covering   long-term concession arrangements to improve   from the cost of delivering public services.  •  Expand digital monitoring: Use the CMU's
 and public-private partnerships (PPPs), supported by   energy  distribution  companies,  aviation  and  other   operational e ciency and service standards.  Turning Reform into Economic Value  reporting platform to improve transparency, track   About the Author: Muhammad Musab Mirza is a finance and
 stronger governance, can help transform SOEs from   commercial enterprises.  Similarly, PPPs  can  support  investment  in  energy   performance and identify  nancial risks.  security professional based in Lahore. He is an ACMA from the
  scal liabilities into productive economic entities.  However, Pakistan's experience demonstrates that   infrastructure, including battery energy storage   Pakistan's SOE reform agenda requires a di erentiated   Conclusion  Institute of Cost Accountants of India, a licensed Public
                                                                 Accountant  and  Lead Auditor  in  Australia,  and  currently  a
 Understanding the Scale of the   transferring  ownership  alone  does  not  guarantee   systems, without requiring the government to  nance   approach  rather  than a uniform ownership model.   Pakistan's SOE  challenge is no longer simply about   PhD-DBA Scholar in Corporate Finance at INTI University,
 Commercially viable entities operating in competitive
 Challenge  improved performance. Research on post-privatisation   the entire investment.  Malaysia. His experience includes KPMG, KAPCO, ABN AMRO,
 enterprises has found mixed results, with some  rms   markets may be suitable for full privatisation.   reducing  nancial losses; it is about ensuring that   Cardex  Diagnostics, the  Royal Australian Navy and  the
 The FY2025 SOE report presents a mixed picture of the   recording insigni cant or negative performance   The  distinction between privatisation  and  PPPs is   Enterprises requiring substantial investment or   public assets generate sustainable economic and   Queensland Government. He also holds a Level 7 professional
 sector. The portfolio's return on invested capital (ROIC)   changes (Faraz & Samad, 2022). Similarly, lengthy   important. Privatisation transfers ownership, whereas   specialised  management  may  bene t  from  social returns. The reforms introduced through the SOE   qualification in Maritime and Security Operations from the
                                                                 University of Adelaide.
 stood at approximately 2.2%, substantially below its   transaction processes and institutional weaknesses   PPPs establish  contractual  arrangements through   concessions and PPPs, while strategically important   Act 2023, the privatisation programme and the
 estimated weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of   have  a ected  the  pace  and  e ectiveness  of  earlier   which private partners may  nance, develop, operate   entities may remain under state ownership with   growing use of PPPs provide an opportunity to address
 around 15%. The resulting negative EVA indicates that   initiatives.  or manage public assets. The choice should depend on   stronger governance and performance requirements.  long-standing weaknesses.
 the  portfolio  is  not  generating  su cient  returns  to   The privatisation of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA)   the commercial viability, strategic importance and   Government  nancial support should also be linked to   However, the success of these initiatives will depend
 cover the cost of capital invested in it (Finance Division,   o ers important lessons. Before the transaction, the   service-delivery requirements of each enterprise.  measurable outcomes, including return on invested   on implementation. Privatisation without competition,
 2025).  capital, EVA, cost recovery and operational e ciency. A
 government absorbed more than Rs.670 billion in   A transparent project-selection process, appropriate   PPPs without e ective risk allocation, and state
 Nevertheless, recent  gures suggest some marginal   liabilities and debt, transferring a substantial part of   risk allocation, competitive bidding and e ective   performance-linked funding framework would help   ownership without professional governance will o er
 ensure that public resources support restructuring and
 improvement. During the  rst half of FY2026,   the historical  nancial burden to taxpayers (Daily   contract monitoring will be essential to ensure that   measurable improvements  rather  than  perpetuating   limited improvements. A coordinated  approach
 pro table SOEs generated gains of Rs. 423.3 billion,   Times, 2026).  This highlights the importance of   PPPs deliver value rather than create new contingent   recurring losses (The Nation, 2025).  combining  nancial discipline, independent oversight,
 while loss-making entities recorded losses of Rs. 342.8   addressing legacy liabilities, operational ine ciencies   liabilities for the government.  operational  restructuring  and  transparent
 billion. This resulted in a narrow net adjusted pro t of   and governance weaknesses before transferring   Governance: The Foundation of   In the energy sector, reducing circular debt requires   public-service funding is essential.
 Rs.  80.5  billion  for  the  sector.  Consequently,  the  net   ownership.  Sustainable Reform  sustained attention to cost recovery, operational   Ultimately, the performance of Pakistan's SOEs should
  scal  ow to the government—representing the   The objective should not simply be to sell an enterprise   e ciency, metering infrastructure and improved   be measured not by their size or the scale of
 di erence  between  SOE  contributions  and  but to establish a commercially viable business   Ownership changes and private-sector participation    nancial settlements between distribution companies   government support they receive, but by their
 government support—stood at approximately Rs. 35.8   operating under transparent rules and genuine   cannot deliver lasting results without e ective   and  power  producers.  Temporary   nancial  contribution to productivity, service delivery,  scal
 billion as per H1-FY2026 report.  competition.   governance. The SOE Act, 2023 and Ownership and   arrangements alone cannot resolve the structural   sustainability and national economic value.
 weaknesses responsible for recurring liabilities.
 Management Policy, 2023 provide a framework for

               50   ICMA’s Chartered Management Accountant, Sep-Oct 2026
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