Page 60 - CMA Journal (Sep-Oct 2026)
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F oc us  S ec t ion



 The government acts  as shareholder without directing   ownership. Employee transition arrangements also   The case illustrates how strategic private investment can   Applying International Experience to
 individual investment decisions, while the board oversees   addressed the protection of wages and retirement   strengthen a capital-intensive enterprise while allowing   Di erentiated SOE Reforms and
 investment  strategy,  portfolio  performance  and  bene ts.  the state to retain minority ownership. However, the
 corporate governance. Investment decisions are made   Malaysia: Government-Linked Companies   success of such arrangements depends on clear   Proposed Framework.
 independently, subject to constitutional safeguards   Transformation Programme  shareholder agreements, e ective regulation and   International experiences demonstrate that SOE reforms
 protecting national reserves. This model separates state   safeguards for public interests.
 ownership from day-to-day management, promoting   Malaysia’s  Government-Linked  Companies  (GLC)  South Africa: South African Airways – Financial and   should not follow a uniform privatisation or restructuring
 professional accountability and long-term value creation.  Transformation Programme (2005–2015) o ers a   approach.  Instead,  Pakistan  should  adopt  an
 structured model for improving the performance of   Operational Restructuring  enterprise-speci c strategy based on the  nancial
 Brazil: Vale: Privatisation of a Commercially Oriented   state-linked enterprises without relying solely on
 Enterprise    South African Airways (SAA) entered business rescue in   viability, commercial potential, strategic importance, and
 The Fiscal Cost of State Ownership  group of enterprises, while major losses are concentrated   Brazil’s  Vale, formerly Companhia  Vale do Rio Doce,   privatisation.  Led  by  the  Putrajaya  Committee  on  GLC   December 2019 after years of  nancial and operational   investment requirements of individual SOEs. Figure 2
 State-owned enterprises (SOEs) play an important role in   in infrastructure, transport and electricity distribution.   illustrates ownership restructuring through privatisation.   High Performance, the programme focused on board   di culties. Its restructuring involved cost reduction, debt   proposed framework for SOE reforms in Pakistan.
               renegotiation, workforce rationalisation, balance-sheet
 Pakistan’s economy by providing essential services and   The contrast between pro table and loss-making power   Established  as  a  state-owned  mining  enterprise,  it  was   e ectiveness, professional management, procurement,
 supporting strategic sectors. However, their continued   distribution companies also suggests that reforms should   privatised in May 1997 through a public auction at the Rio   capital  allocation,  human  resource  development  and   restructuring and the return of leased aircraft.  The
 relevance depends on the economic and social value they   consider entity-level performance rather than apply a   de Janeiro Stock Exchange. The Brazil Consortium, led by   operational e ciency. It introduced measurable key   government provided approximately ZAR 24.9 billion in
 deliver against public resources consumed. Declining   uniform sector-wide approach.  Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, acquired 41.73% of its   performance indicators (KPIs), performance-linked    nancial support, enabling the airline to exit business
 pro tability,  rising   scal  support  and  uneven  Financial Performance and the   voting shares, shifting the company from state to   compensation and stronger management accountability.   rescue in 2021. The case highlights the role of formal
 performance highlight concerns about their  nancial   Deteriorating Fiscal Return  •  Sharp decline in net  scal returns:  Net  scal   ow   The programme also encouraged clearer de nition of   restructuring in  addressing  accumulated  liabilities  and
 sustainability, governance and e ectiveness.  contracted  signi cantly  due to  higher  government   (SOEs). Between 2020 and 2025, all  ve governance   private-sector control. This was followed by international   social obligations and the divestment of non-core or   operational ine ciencies. However, the scale of public
 Pakistan’s SOE portfolio is facing an increasing gap   expansion, demonstrating how privatisation can reshape   support and subsequent governance challenges
 The OECD’s Guidelines on Corporate Governance of   between  nancial performance and  scal obligations.   support and lower SOE contributions.  indicators deteriorated, particularly political stability, rule   investment incentives and commercial performance. The   unpro table  assets.  This  approach  strengthened   underline the need to combine  nancial restructuring
 State-Owned Enterprises 2024 o er a framework for   Aggregate  revenue  declined  by  3%  during  •  Declining returns on investment: Lower ROE and   of law, and regulatory quality. The decline in control of   case also highlights the importance of transparent   commercial discipline while retaining government   with operational sustainability and stronger corporate
 reform, emphasising clear ownership objectives,   July–December 2025, while net pro t fell by nearly 30%.    ROA indicate reduced returns relative to shareholders’   corruption also raises concerns about the institutional   valuation, competitive bidding, regulatory oversight and   ownership and strategic oversight.  oversight to secure long-term viability. Table 5 shows key
 accountable boards, operational autonomy, transparent   On the other hand, government support increased by   funds and assets, raising concerns about capital   safeguards needed to ensure transparent procurement,   safeguards when transferring strategic public assets.  Romania: OMV Petrom – Strategic Private-Sector
 disclosure and explicit funding of public-service   31%, whereas contributions from SOEs declined by 19%.   productivity and the e ectiveness of public   e ective oversight and accountability in public   Participation with Retained State Ownership  lessons for Pakistan based on international practices.
 obligations.  Pakistan  needs  a  di erentiated,  As a result, the portfolio’s net  scal  ow contracted   investment.  enterprises.  These trends do not demonstrate that   India: Ordnance Factory Board – Corporatisation
 performance-based approach that considers each SOE’s   sharply, indicating that the government is receiving   Despite strong  nancial-sector growth and higher oil and   governance weaknesses directly caused SOE  nancial   under State Ownership  Romania’s privatisation of Petrom in 2004 demonstrates a
 commercial  viability,  strategic  importance  and  substantially lower net  scal returns despite committing   gas pro ts, total SOE revenue declined by 3.0% and   losses; rather, they suggest that SOEs operate within an   India’s restructuring of the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB)   mixed-ownership model involving a strategic private   Overall Policy Lesson for
 public-service role.  greater public resources.  aggregate pro t fell by 29.5%. The power sector's shift to   institutional environment that may complicate the   Total government in ows from SOEs declined by 19.5%,   strategy re ects the enterprise's  nancial position,   demonstrates how corporatisation can improve SOE   investor. Austria’s OMV acquired a controlling 51.01%   Pakistan: The central lesson is that
 Concentration of Pro tability and   •  Weakening earnings position:  Net  pro t  declined   a loss and persistent infrastructure de cits underscore   implementation  of  commercial  reforms,  investment   from PKR 1,043.0 billion to PKR 839.8 billion, while  scal   commercial  viability,  strategic  importance  and  performance without privatisation. In October 2021, the   stake through a combination of share acquisition and a   SOE  reform  must  address  the
 decisions and performance monitoring. The relevance of
 Losses Across SOEs  despite  largely  unchanged  aggregate  losses,  how concentrated sectoral losses continue to erode   this institutional context becomes clearer when   support to SOEs increased by 30.5%, from PKR 616.0   public-service obligations. Countries have adopted   government reorganised the former departmental   capital increase, investing approximately EUR 1.5 billion in   underlying  causes  of  poor
 overall  pro tability, reinforcing  the need for  targeted
 the transaction.  The  Romanian state retained  a 20.7%
 The top ten pro t-making and loss-making SOEs show   indicating a deterioration in the portfolio’s overall   restructuring, stronger accountability, and sector-speci c   considered alongside SOE  nancial results for the  rst half   billion to PKR 804.0 billion. Consequently, the net  scal   di erent approaches, ranging from professionalised state   structure into seven wholly government-owned Defence   stake, while the remaining shares were held by pension   performance rather than
 ownership  and  corporatisation  to  private-sector
 that pro tability is concentrated among a relatively small   earnings performance.  performance benchmarks.   of FY2026. The 29.5% decline in SOE net pro t, alongside    ow to the government fell sharply by 91.6%, from PKR   participation, performance-based governance and   Public Sector Undertakings, bringing 41 production units   funds, individual investors and other shareholders. The   ownership change as an end in itself.
 under separate corporate entities. These included Yantra
 427.0 billion to PKR 35.8 billion. Although dividends and
 Pakistan’s Governance Indicators and   a 30.5% increase in government  scal support during H1   tax receipts increased, lower non-tax revenue and interest    nancial restructuring.   India Limited, Munitions India  Limited and  Armoured   investment  provided  capital  for  modernisation,  Pakistan's persistent SOE losses re ect
 FY2026, highlights the need for stronger  nancial
 Their Relevance to SOE Performance  discipline and accountability.  receipts reduced overall in ows.  This widening gap   Singapore: Temasek Holdings  Vehicles Nigam Limited. The reform aimed to strengthen   expansion and operational development, while bringing   deeper weaknesses in governance,   Reference
 private-sector management expertise and technology
 operational autonomy,  e ciency, innovation  and
                                                                   H1 FY2025 report, pp. 26–27; H1 FY2026 report, pp. 26–27.  bi_annual_report_2025
 Pakistan's Worldwide Governance Indicators provide an   Furthermore, the  scal relationship between state-owned   between government  receipts  and   nancial  support   Singapore’s  Temasek Holdings, established in 1974,   commercial  accountability  while  retaining  state  into the company.   political  and  administrative  •   (2).pdf; FY_2026_SOE_Biannual_Report _6 Months (1).pdf. Note: The change compares
 important institutional context for assessing the   enterprises  (SOEs)  and  the  government  weakened   highlights the growing  scal burden of SOEs and   demonstrates a professional approach to state ownership   interference,  nancial discipline, and   the  same  six-month  period  in  both  years.
                                                                   https://www. nance.gov.pk/publications/FY_2026_SOE_Biannual_Report%20_6%20
 performance and reform of state-owned enterprises   signi cantly in the  rst half of FY2026.   reinforces  the  need for stronger   nancial  discipline,   through an independent investment holding structure.   the absence of clear accountability for   Months.pdf
                                                                   OECD (2024), OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises
 improved operational performance, and targeted reforms   Wholly owned by the Singapore Minister for Finance, it   commercial  and  public-service  •   2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/18a24f43-en
                                                                   https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators/
 to reduce reliance on public resources.  operates as a commercial investment company with its   mandates.    •  interactive-data-access
 own board and management.                                      •  https://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/30/world/sale-of-brazil-s-state-mining-
 Identi ed Challenges  Therefore, reform requires a shift from     company-is-delayed.html
                                                                   https://www.temasek.com.sg/content/dam/temasek-corporate/our- nancials/
                  protecting individual enterprises to          •  investor-library/annual-review/en-tr-thumbnail-and-pdf/temasek-review-2008.pdf
 The evidence in Figure 1, highlights four                      •  https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2222169®=48&lang=2
 interconnected challenges shaping Pakistan’s   safeguarding  public  value,  with  •  Programme-Graduation-Report.pdf
                                                                   https://pcg.gov.my/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GLC-Transformation-
 SOE reform agenda. These challenges call for a   government acting as an e ective   •  https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/public-enterprises-welcomes-exit-
 di erentiated SOE reform framework based on   owner, policymaker and regulator   •  saa-business-rescue-practitioners-30-apr
                                                                   https://nationalgovernment.co.za/entity_annual/3182/2022-south-african-
  nancial viability, strategic importance, and   rather than a day-to-day manager.   airways-(saa)-annual-report.pdf
                                                                   https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/media-statement-public-
 public-service  obligations,  combining                        •  enterprises-committee-receives-brie ng-ag-saas-audit-outcomes-over-four- nancial-
 performance-based autonomy, time-bound   Ultimately, the success of SOE reform   •  years
                                                                   https://www.omvpetrom.com/en/investors/reports-and-publications/publications/
 restructuring,  transparent  public-service  should be measured not by the   annual-reports/2004
 funding, and credible exit mechanisms.  number of enterprises privatised or   • •  https://www.pcg.gov.my/about_us_overview/
                                                                   https://www.omvpetrom.com/en
                  restructured,   but    by   sustained         •  https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1739060®=48&lang=2
 Global Case Studies:   improvements  in     operational        •  https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1764148®=48&lang=2
                                                                   https://www.vale.com/history-center#:~:text=Vale's%20 rst%20shares%20are%
 Transformation of State-Owned   e ciency,  nancial viability, service   • •  20auctioned,Rio%20de%20Janeiro%20Stock%20Exchange
                                                                   https://www.temasek.com.sg/en/about-us/corporate-governance
 Enterprises      delivery   and   the    reduction   of        • •  https://www.mof.gov.sg/policies/reserves/who-manages-the-reserves/
                                                                   https://pcg.gov.my/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GLC-Transformation-
 International experience demonstrates that SOE   contingent  scal risks.  •  Programme-Graduation-Report.pdf
                                                                   https://vale.com/
 reform is most e ective when the restructuring
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